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Abstract-Aerospace electrical systems are required 
to withstand and adequately operate in extremely 
harsh environments that include, for example, high 
radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense 
vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. 
The nature of aerospace electronics also demands 
high reliability since, with very few exceptions, 
there is no chance for hardware servicing or 
repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for 
this type of situation are to perform a Reliability 
Analysis of the system throughout the development 
cycle, and to use electrical components that are 
regarded as “high reliability” because of additional 
controls and requirements applied in their design, 
manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies 
have shown that even though these techniques are 
used, many systems fail to meet mission 
requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. 
This paper presents the analysis of failures of 
electrical parts, experienced during various stages 
of system development, at NASA Goddard Space 
Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 
2001 and 2013.  These components were subjected 
to qualification, screening and testing in which the 
goal was to ensure that the components would 
survive the stresses of the mission.  The analysis 
categorizes failures by part type and failure 
mechanisms. 
One of the results of the analysis was the realization 
that a surprising proportion of failures experienced 
during system integration and testing were caused 
by human error (i.e. human induced defect).  
Further analysis included the determination of root 
failure mechanisms and any influencing factors 
contributing to these failures. The major causes of 
these defects were attributed to electrostatic 
damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), 
mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal 
overstress (TOS). 
Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool 
which incorporates these major causes for the 
failures, termed error-producing conditions 
(EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing 
the number of each type of failure that has 
occurred at the facility under study.  These factors 
are quantified and used to communicate the risk of 
human induced defects for the assembly, 
integration and testing of space hardware based on 
the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk 
identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions 
more effectively, based on the presence of 
component categories or other hazardous 
conditions that have a history of failure due to 
human error.  
The proposed methodology is demonstrated with 
an example. 
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Risk management is a vital project process whose 
purpose is to identify, analyze, treat and monitor risk 
continuously during the development of complex 
systems.  The most basic and over-arching risk is one 
that describes system failure. Tracking the risk of 
failure is especially vital for electronic hardware 
destined for missions in outer space, since, with few 
exceptions, there is no chance for conducting repairs 
of the space system once it is deployed.  Additionally, 
the cost associated with space systems makes the 
complete replacement of a malfunctioning satellite or 
planetary rover impractical. For these reasons, 
accurately identifying, analyzing and monitoring the 
risk of system failure is critical in order to assist 
everyone from design engineers to program managers 
with developing a system that will fulfill, and 
preferably surpass mission requirements. 
 
There are unique challenges that make accurately 
calculating the reliability of electrical space systems 
(and conversely, the risk of failure) difficult. In 
general, the most effective source of data is from 
systems that have actually failed during operation in 
the intended environment (i.e. field failures).  This 
type of physical analysis is essentially nonexistent 
since space systems, as mentioned previously, are 
rarely retrievable to allow for a failure analysis. With 
the lack of useful empirical data, another option is to 
conduct tests in laboratories to accumulate operational 
and failure data on the devices used in space system 
designs.  This testing poses another issue, since 
development agencies cannot afford to purchase extra 
devices and assemblies for stress testing in quantities 
that would be statistically significant from which 
accurate failure models and reliability predictions can 
be devised. Additionally, the replication of the mission 
environment and duration in order to test hardware 
poses its own unique challenges of feasibility.  
 
A common method for calculating the reliability of 
electrical systems is to use statistics and probability 
methods that provide quantitative data with reliability 
indices from testing by experimentation and by 
simulations. Additionally, a physics of failure (PoF) 
approach has gained considerable use as it seeks to 
quantify component reliability by investigating and 
modeling the root cause processes of device failures 
based on operational parameters and stresses.(1,2) The 
main criticism regarding these reliability calculation 
methods is that the predicted failure rates are not 
accurate when compared to failure rates observed in 
the field. Several studies have been conducted that 
documented numerous failures very early in the 
systems’ predicted mission life. One of the studies 
showed a failure rate indicative of systems 
experiencing failures early in their life cycle, due to 
defects designed into or manufactured into the device 
(commonly referred to as infant mortalities).(3) This is 
in contrast to mature systems, that have predicted 
failures caused by wear out, after all mission 
requirements have been met.(4)  
 
A possible cause for this discrepancy is the fact that 
most of these reliability calculation methods do not 
take into account possible defects introduced into 
electronic systems during system assembly, 
integration and testing, such as defects caused by 
technicians handling the devices. Such risks could be 
handled separately with a Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA), but these methods also have 
accuracy issues and criticisms such as being overly 
dependent on expert opinion and the uncertainty of 
data concerning different human factors.(5)    
  
The primary purpose of this study is to propose a risk 
analysis technique where factors based on electrical 
component failure data are used in a proposed Risk 
Analysis Tool. This visual tool, similar to the popular 
Risk Matrix, displays the relative risk of failure for all 
the electrical components, based on the major causes 
of electrical failures and a proportionality factor 
representing the quanitity of each type of failure that 
has occurred.  
 
The main data source of this study is an analysis 
conducted on failure reports of electrical components 
from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) 
Failure Analysis Lab. These reports provide very in-
depth investigations of components that failed 
between the years 2001 and 2013. The failures 
occurred to components during the system 
development phase starting at the point a component 
was received from the manufacturer and ending with 
fully integrated system testing. The focus of this 
analysis was to determine the failures caused by 
defects induced by technicians and other personnel 
handing the electronics. Using the information 
contained in the reports, the types of components that 
failed during different stages of system integration 
were categorized, and the mechanisms that contributed 
to these failures were determined. There was also an 
attempt to deduce where/when the original defect 
occurred that eventually caused the failures. This data  
was also the primary data source used to develop a 
technique for incorporating electrical component 
failure data into the HRA technique, Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART).(6) 
The modification factors developed in this technique 




2. RELIABILITY & HRA BACKGROUND  
 
2.1 Reliability Analysis 
 
A study of over 4,000 spacecraft missions from 1980 
to 2005 was conducted by Mak Tafazoli of the 
Canadian Space Agency to determine the quantities of 
failures and their contributing factors that occurred 
between 1980 and 2005.(7) In a span of 25 years, more 
than 4,000 spacecraft were launched with 156 on-orbit 
failures recorded. For the author’s analysis, a failure 
was defined as an incident that would either prevent 
the spacecraft from fulfilling its primary mission 
objectives (loss of mission) or cause a portion of the 
mission objectives to be abandoned (mission 
degradation). One of the major conclusions of 
Tafazoli’s analysis was that many of the failures 
occurred before accomplishing their mission, even 
though they used relatively modern technologies and 
conducted thorough testing. Specifically, 40% of all 
failures happened within the first year of on-orbit 
activities, implying insufficient testing and inadequate 
modeling of the spacecraft and its environment. (7)  The 
study further reveals that electrical failures were 
responsible for 45% of the total failures. The Power, 
Command and Data Handling (C&DH), and 
Telemetry, Tracking & Command (TTC) subsystems, 
which are dominated by electrical components, 
contributed to 54% of all failures with almost 50% of 
them occurring in the first year. Another conclusion of 
the analysis is that only 17% of the failures were 
caused by interactions with the space environment, 
such as solar and magnetic storms and space debris 
and meteorites, with 83% related to internal issues 
which include human error and design flaws. (7) 
 
Another study also collected failure data for 1584 
Earth-orbiting satellites successfully launched 
between 1990 and 2008. The authors conducted a 
nonparametric analysis of satellite reliability and 
demonstrated that a Weibull distribution with a shape 
parameter of less than one (<1), properly captures the 
on-orbit failure behavior of satellites.(3,4) A Weibull 
shape parameter of less than one is indicative of a 
decreasing failure rate, commonly referred to as infant 
mortality, a situation where devices are dead on arrival 
or fail very quickly in operation due to defects 
designed into or manufactured into the device. This is 
in contrast to the notion that due to the use of high 
reliability components and extensive testing, a 
Weibull distribution with a shape parameter fixed at 
1.7 should be used for satellite systems, indicating 
failures due to wear-out mechanisms.  The existence 
of a decreasing failure rate has been shown in 
additional studies of empirical data.(8-9) 
 
2.2 HRA Methods 
An HRA is a vital component of the larger-scoping 
Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) and 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA). The goal of a 
PSA and PRA is to quantify a system’s total risk (in 
terms of probability and severity) and identify issues 
that can have the greatest effect on safety. The HRA’s 
focus is to quantify the probability of human error (i.e. 
an operator or technician fails to perform a given task 
or operation under a given condition), and determine 
the impact these human errors have on safety. Most 
industrial processes involve a great deal of human-
machine interactions such as assembly, inspection, 
maintenance, operation and monitoring. The 
occurrence of errors can also be affected by other 
organizational factors such as training, experience, 
and work procedures, and programmatic concerns 
such as mission requirements, budget and schedule.  
Although many HRA techniques were first developed 
by the nuclear industry during the 1970s and 1980s, 
such as Technique for Human Error Rate Predication 
(THERP) and HEART, many other industries tailored 
and utilized these methods to provide more relevant 
predictions that take into account industry-unique 
factors. Examples include the Hazard and Operability 
Analysis (HAZOP) and Explosive Atmosphere 
(ATEX) methods used in the chemical industry, and 
Eurocontrol Safety Assessment Method (SAM) for air 
traffic control. Other industries that have developed 
custom HRA methods include railway transportation, 
medical and offshore oil installations.(11-13) These 
industry methods identify specific risk-influencing 
factors (RIFs) and processes to quantify and 
incorporate them into their HEP calculation.(11)  
The methodology proposed in a previous study used 
electrical component failure data to determine part 
categories and situations where failures occur more 
frequently due to human error. (6)  The generic human 
error probabilities used in the HEART method were 
scaled with respect to the presence of these component 
categories and situations based on all electrical failures 
encountered. These factors are then used to produce 
the effective HEP. 
The standard HEART method consists of thirty-eight 
Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) that may affect the 
task reliability, each with a corresponding weight 
ranging from 3-17. The selection of applicable EPCs 
and their respective weights is determined by an 
analyst. NOTE: To maintain consistency, this weight 
range (3-17) was also used for incorporating electrical 
part failure EPCs. There is an additional multiplicative 
factor, the Assessed Proportion of Affect (𝐴𝑝𝑖), for 
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each EPC, ranging from 0 to 1, also determined by an 
analyst. For consistency, the methodology proposed in 
the previous study maintains the same format for EPC 
(range 3-17) and 𝐴𝑝𝑖 (range 0-1)
 (6). A key difference 
between the method contained in the previous study is 
that it uses analyzed failure data to determine the EPC 
weights and factors instead of relying on expert 
analysis, as typically done in the customized methods 
of other industries. 
 
3.   FAILURE REPORT ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
 
The data that was analyzed for this study originated in 
failure reports spanning a period of approximately 
thirteen years, from January 2001 through September 
2013. These detailed reports are created when a system 
development project requests the Failure Analysis Lab 
to perform a detailed analysis of a failed electrical 
component. Background information is included 
describing the situation that led to the failure; for 
example, the component failed a visual inspection or 
electrical testing.  Occasionally detailed information 
regarding the assembly history was included, for 
example, an incident occurring at initial power up or 
following environmental of electrical testing, or a 
unique situation such as testing following a component 
repair/replacement. A total of 283 reports were 
reviewed. Data from 232 of these reports were 
categorized for this analysis. The remaining 51 reports 
described instances where the initial failures during 
system testing were not confirmed at the Failure 
Analysis Lab. Situations where this could have 
occurred include undetected defects in the component 
mounting (e.g. improper solder joint that was no 
longer present after the component was removed) or a 
fault that was intermittent. Figure 1 shows the number 
of failures that occurred per year, with a mean of 18 




3.1 Failure Data Analysis 
 
All of the failure reports were carefully examined to 
diagnose the root cause of the failure.  In order to 
ascertain trends and causes, the failures were sorted 
into the following categories: electrostatic discharge, 
electrical overstress, thermal overstress, mechanical 
overstress, foreign material, chemical reaction. 
 
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) is the failure 
mechanism that occurred when there was evidence on 
the semiconductor die of severe, localized damage. 
The indication is typically in the form of a crater or 
eruption through the insulating oxide layer seen only 
using extremely high magnification such as a scanning 
electron microscope.  The incidence of ESD damage 
involves an almost instantaneous transfer of electrical 
energy coupled with a very high static potential. 
Thermal damage is minimal as compared to Electrical 
Overstress. Some of the reports mentioned situations 
where the device or circuit board handling was suspect 
with respect to ESD control, but typically the damage 
induction is not recognized by the handler.    
 
Electrical Overstress (EOS) is a failure mechanism in 
which damage occurs to an electrical component that 
is operated above its absolute maximum electrical 
rated limits. EOS is similar to ESD, but typically is 
slower, involves higher current, generating heat 
resulting in thermal damage. Often the failure involves 
other mechanisms such as conductive foreign material 
that creates a short circuit between two conductors 
resulting in excessive current. Another situation where 
EOS of a component can occur is during electrical 
testing using external power supplies.  
 
Thermal Overstress (TOS) is a failure mechanism 
where damage occurs when the thermal energy 
exceeds the dissipation limits of a material. The source 
of the high thermal energy can be external such as 
from an oven or soldering iron or from an internal 
source such as excessive current during an EOS event. 
Additionally, the thermal energy will also lead to 
material expansion which can cause additional failure 
mechanisms. Once again, certain failure reports 
described scenarios that made the failure mechanism 
obvious such as the use of an improper temperature 
during thermal testing or exposure to excessive heat 
during soldering rework. 
 
Mechanical Overstress (MOS) is a failure mechanism 
in which damage occurs due to an excessive 
mechanical force.  There were occasions where the 
damage was caused by external forces due to blatant 
operator error such as dropping a tool on a component 
or cracking a ceramic package due to excessive torque 
on a mounting bolt. Less obvious external forces 
caused cracking of glass seals around leads in ceramic 
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packages probably caused from improper component 
lead bend-and-trim operations. These mechanical 
forces can also be generated internally due to a 
thermally expanding encapsulant that provides a 
tensile force, causing a failure (e.g. lifting a gold wire 
ball bond off its pad).         
 
Foreign Material (FM) is the category that is defined 
as the presence of any material that is not designed into 
the product, or any material that is displaced from its 
original or intended position within the device. Tests 
used to detect the presence of foreign material include: 
visual inspection, X-ray, particle impact noise 
detection, and energy-dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. 
Issues that can be caused by foreign material include 
poor adhesion of encapsulants, adhesives, solder and 
wire bonds (due to contamination between mating 
surfaces), and shorts caused by conductive particles 
between two conductors. Additionally, a source of 
foreign material can come from a loss of hermetic seal 
of a device allowing the entry of air and other 
contaminants (e.g. soldering flux) into its internal 
cavity.  
 
Chemical Reactions (CR) can be considered a subset 
of the foreign material category since usually there is 
foreign material present that acts as a reactant or 
catalyst in a chemical reaction. Examples of chemical 
reactions include the formation of dendrites which 
usually occurs in the presence of moisture or the 
formation of intermetallic compounds between bonds 
of dissimilar metals. 
 
The following figure depicts the quantities of failures 
as a function of failure modes. 
 
Fig 2 – Number of Failures of Each Part Type 
3.1.1. Determining Defect Occurrence 
 
Part of the analysis also included an attempt to deduce 
the point in time when the original defects occurred, 
which later resulted in a failure. An example scenario 
is a technician damaging a component via ESD during 
circuit board assembly, but the actual failure was not 
discovered until assembly level testing, much later in 
the development schedule. The failure report typically 
stated when the failure was discovered (e.g. during 
electrical or thermal cycling testing), but determining 
where the initial defect occurred was more 
challenging. For the purpose of this study, space 
system developers were referred to as component 
users, who procure components from the component 
manufacturers.  The goal of this portion of the analysis 
was to differentiate between defects that were induced 
by the manufacturers and ones induced by the users. 
The presence of foreign material or mechanical issues 
inside hermetically sealed devices were regarded as 
manufacturer-induced. Conversely, ESD defects were 
considered user-induced defects. Manufacturers 
typically have effective and regulated processes and 
techniques to prevent ESD damage to their specific 
parts. Conversely, defects caused by component 
installation onto printed circuit boards were 
considered user-induced. 
 
The number of failures that were induced by the users 
was more significant than expected. As discussed 
previously, information contained in various reports 
described situations such as improper trimming and 
bending of part leads damaging the glass seals around 
these leads, solder rework causing thermal stresses 
that induce micro-cracks in ceramic surface mounted 
components, and improper application of staking 
material which caused failures during vibration 
testing. Figure 3 shows that 41% of the failures were 
attributed to users. Figure 4 shows a breakdown of 
user-induced defects by part type. Figure 5 shows the 
total number of user-induced failures experienced due 
to the top three failure mechanisms. 
 
 




Fig 4 – User-Induced Defects by Part Type 
 
Fig 5 – Total User-Induced Defects by Mechanism 
 
3.1.2. Concerns over User Induced Defects 
 
The fact that so many defects were induced during 
component handling, system assembly, integration 
and testing is concerning for several reasons. First, 
some of the generated defects may cause immediate 
component failures. These failures should then be 
discovered during system testing, but the resulting is a 
program schedule delay as the failure is investigated, 
failure mechanism and collateral damage determined 
and finally the failed component replaced. In addition 
to the schedule penalty, there is also a budgetary 
penalty as additional resources need to be used to 
complete required actions (e.g. repairs, failure 
analysis). Secondly, these defects can cause latent 
failures that might not manifest until after mission 
commencement, when additional stresses are applied 
to the system (e.g. launch, thermal). The defects that 
were originally induced, such as micro-cracks in 
ceramic surface mount devices, may not grow large 
enough to cause a failure during burn-in or system 
testing, but may further propagate during the mission 
until a failure occurs. ESD damage is also a known risk 
for latent defects.(14-17) The final reason for concern is 
that the original reliability calculations for these 
designs typically do not take these user-induced 
defects and failures into account. A reliability 
calculation is typically conducted based on a list of 
parts in the circuit and a manufacturer provided failure 
rate for each component. Suppose a situation where 
two identical electronic circuit boards are being 
assembled at different facilities. A reliability 
assessment calculated based on the number of parts or 
on the physics of failure would be identical. However, 
if one facility used proper techniques, processes and 
equipment while the other had a history of inducing 
defects, the field reliability could be very different for 
each circuit board. This difference needs to be 
accounted for by having this risk of failure identified 
and tracked appropriately. 
 
 Figures 6 shows the breakdown of different failure 
mechanisms for microcircuits and passive devices, the 
two part types that experienced the most user-induced 
defects. The most common failure mechanism for 
microcircuits is ESD, while for passive components, 
the most common failure mechanism caused by human 
error was MOS. 
 
Fig 6 – User Induced Failures by Mechanism & Part Type 
 
Figures 7 show the breakdown of each of the failure 
modes with respect to part types.  
 
 
Fig 7 – User Induced Failures by Part Type & Mechanism  
 
The remainder of this paper will expand on and 
demonstrate the proposed risk analysis methodology 
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that incorporates component failure data. 
Specifically, the data depicted in figures 6 and 7 will 
be used to quantify the risk for each failure 
mechanisms, while the Engineer’s Assessed 
Proportion (𝐴𝑝𝑖) will be calculated from the data 
depicted in figure 5.  
 
4. INCORPORATION OF COMPONENT 
FAILURE DATA 
     
Based on the information obtained from the failure 
analysis reports, the major failure mechanisms caused 
by user-induced defects were ESD overstress, 
mechanical overstress, and thermal overstress. These 
will be treated as Error Producing Conditions. The 
Engineer’s Assessed Proportion (𝐴𝑝𝑖) will be 
determined from the percentages of failures for each 
failure mechanism with respect to the total number of 
failures tracked (all failure mechanisms 
combined).This is consistent with the focus of 
HEART, in which the Engineer’s Assessed Proportion 
signifies the degree of effect of each of the EPCs(10). 
With the proposed method, the EPC is a measure of 
the sensitivity or vulnerability each of the individual 
electrical parts has to the different failure mechanisms, 
and the 𝐴𝑝𝑖  is a function of the percentage of failed 
parts caused by the specific failure mechanism (EPC) 
to the total number of failed parts. For example, if a 
part is highly sensitive to a specific failure mechanism, 
the EPC will be a high value, potentially approaching 
the maximum EPC value of 17. Conversely, if the 
facility handling the part is specially equipped to 
handle the part without inducing defects caused by the 
same failure mechanism, the degree of effect 
(𝑖. 𝑒. 𝐴𝑝𝑖) will reduce the contribution of that EPC. 
Finally, if a facility initially has numerous failures due 
to a specific failure mechanism, and then makes 
changes in order to lower the risk of inducing those 
defects, the respective 𝐴𝑝𝑖  will be reduced as the 
number of failures goes down.   
 
4.1. Individual Factor Calculation 
As previously mentioned, the risk of inducing a defect 
due to ESD is directly related to the sensitivity of the 
device to ESD damage. The ESD factor can be 
quantified with respect to an industry standard ESD 
rating for each component which is based on its 
sensitivity to damage. These standard ratings for ESD 









0A < 125 
0B 125 to < 250 
1A 250 to < 500 
1B 500 to < 1000 
1C 1000 to < 2000 
2 2000 to < 4000 
3A 4000 to < 8000 
3B >= 8000 
 
Electrical components are classified by their 
sensitivity to a high voltage electrostatic shock. The 
more sensitive the component, the lower the 
magnitude of voltage shock required to damage the 
component. Typically, ESD damage is induced with 
no warning or obvious signs on the component. While 
handling electronics, the generation of electric charge 
must be continuously monitored and mitigated. For 
background information, Table II shows typical 
electrostatic voltages that can be generated by human 
actions for two different levels of relative humidity 37. 
These values are extremely high, relative to the 
maximum ESD voltage ratings shown in Table I. The 
reason that devices are not damaged more frequently 
is due to ESD Protected Areas that have specific 
controls in order to prevent the generation of high 
electrostatic voltages.  These areas use equipment and 
tools made of specific materials that prevent high 
electrostatic voltages from being generated. They also 
contain monitoring equipment that alarms if controls 
are not in a satisfactory condition (19).   
Table II. Typical Electrostatic Voltage Generation 
Values 
 
Table III shows the mapping of ESD ratings to EPC 
values. The EPC values range from 3 to 17 (10). As 
mentioned earlier, this range is used in order to 
Means of Generation 10-25%  RH 40 %  RH
Walking across carpet 35,000V 15,000V
Walking across vinyl tile 12,000V 5,000V
Motion of Individuals Not 
Grounded
6,000V 800V
Remove Bubble Pack from 
Package
26,000V 20,000V
Poly bag picked up from bench 20,000V 10,000V
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maintain consistency with the original HEART 
method. The first column lists out all of the ESD 
ratings for electrical parts. The second column shows 
the respective EPC value. The values are a linear 
distribution with the most sensitive part rating, 0A, 
receiving the maximum EPC value of 17, and the least 
sensitive part, 3B, correlating to the lowest EPC value, 
3.The values are reduced by 2 for each part category, 
as the sensitivity, and therefore risk, is reduced. 
 















The Engineer’s Assessed Proportion of Effect for ESD 
is the proportion of failures induced by the user caused 
by ESD to the total number of failures induced by the 
users, as shown in Equation 1. 
 
                                         (1) 
 
where 𝐴𝑝𝐸𝑆𝐷 represents the Engineer’s Assessed 
Proportion of Effect for ESD,  𝑛𝐸𝑆𝐷 is the total number 
of components that failed due to ESD and 𝑁 represents 
the total number of failed components in the analyzed 
source data. As previously stated, this signifies the 
degree of effect of the EPC. It represents the 
probability that a failure was caused by the failure 
mechanism represented by the EPC out of all electrical 
failures. The use of empirical data to determine this 
proportionality effect is a major difference to methods 
that use expert judgment. 
 
The EPC for mechanical overstress (EPCMOS) can be 
quantified based on specific issues relating to part 
handling and the assembly process.  One leading cause 
of failure due to MOS is a result of bending and cutting 
the leads of certain electrical components. This 
process is necessary in order for the component to be 
correctly mounted on the printed circuit board with all 
of the correct electrical connections. Since 
components come in various shapes, sizes and lead 
configurations, this process needs to be tailored for 
different parts.  If the process is done incorrectly, the 
glass seal that surrounds each of the metal lead as it 
leaves the component body can be damaged, or 
possibly the component body itself may be damaged 
as indicated by cracks and chip-outs. Human error-
induced defects can also be attributed to the improper 
handling of electrical components made from brittle 
materials such as ceramic, also indicated by cracks and 
chip-outs. These cracks may start out as micro-cracks, 
which may not be detected during inspection, but 
propagate and expand over time. Additionally, the 
improper staking of larger components can cause a 
part to fail during or after vibration testing. Each of 
these examples was observed in the source failure 
data. 
 
The EPCMOS is obtained from a careful analysis of the 
parts involved in the electrical hardware assembly 
being assessed for the likelihood of human error. The 
assessor will need information from the design and 
component engineers regarding the number of parts 
that require lead bend-and-trim operations or unique 
mounting techniques and the stresses encountered 
during these processes. Based on this information the 
assessor will assign each part a score between the 
values 0.18 and 1. An electrical part encountering 
more mechanical stresses during the assembly process 
will receive a score closer to 1. This score is then 
multiplied by 17 to generate the part’s EPCMOS. The 
resulting part’s EPC weighting will be within the 
range of 3-17, consistent with the range of all other 
EPC’s. The EPCMOS for the assembly is obtained in the 
same way as with ESD, which is to calculate the mean 
of the individual parts’ EPCMOS. The Engineer’s 
Assessed Proportion of Effect for MOS (𝐴𝑝𝑀𝑂𝑆) is the 
proportion of failures induced by the user caused by 
MOS to the total number of failures induced by the 
users, obtained from the original failure data.         
 
The EPC for thermal overstress (EPCTOS) is obtained 
from a similar analysis of the parts involved in the 
electrical hardware assembly task. A significant 
number of parts from the source failure data analysis 
showed a detrimental contribution from touch-up 
soldering,  a technique where a technician creates an 
initial solder joint which may not be satisfactory, and 
then reapplies the soldering iron to the component 
joint in order to redress it.  Depending on the duration 
of time the soldering iron is applied, subsequently 
reapplied and the time in between, large temperature 
excursions may occur that cause irregular material 
expansion resulting in tensile stresses. These stresses 
can cause fractures in the material. Failed solder joints 
and thermal damage were also observed after repeated 
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soldering evolutions that were required to replace a 
failed component.   Once again, the assessor will need 
information from the design and component engineers 
regarding the assembly process, specifically the 
soldering or epoxy techniques that will be used to 
mount the components. As with EPCMOS, this 
information will then be used to generate a score 
between 0.18 and 1. This score will then be multiplied 
by 17 to obtain a EPCTOS within the range of 3-17.  The 
EPCTOS for the assembly is obtained in the same way 
as with ESD, which is to calculate the mean of the 
individual parts’ EPCTOS. The Engineer’s Assessed 
Proportion of Effect for MOS (𝐴𝑝𝑇𝑂𝑆) is the 
proportion of failures induced by the user caused by 
TOS to the total number of failures induced by the 
users, obtained from the original failure data. 
 
4.2  Risk Communication 
 
     As discussed previously, the goal of the proposed 
method is to provide system engineers and risk 
analysts a quantitative tool to manage and a visual tool 
to communicate the risk of electrical part failure 
caused by defects induced by users during system 
assembly, integration, and testing. A common way of 
communicating risk to multiple stakeholders is using a 
risk matrix, as it can streamline all risks into one picture 
and show relative rankings.(20) The proposed method 
utilizes a modified risk matrix (unidimensional risk 
factor vector (RFV)) to communicate the risk associated 
with electrical parts that are under analysis. Instead of 
the conventional axes representing “Probability” and 
“Consequence”, only a risk factor (RF) associated with 
probability is represented and plotted on the horizontal 
axis. The RF is calculated for each part as the product 
of the EPCs for each of the failure mechanisms 
analyzed, and the Engineer’s Assessed Proportion of 
Effect for each failure mechanism, respectively, shown 
in Equation 2, (shown for the ESD failure mechanism) 
 
  
           (2) 
 
 
where 𝑖 represents each individual electrical component 
in the assembly, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟(𝑖) 𝐸𝑆𝐷 represents the RF 
related to ESD for the 𝑖th component,   𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑆𝐷(𝑖) 
represents the EPC for ESD for the 𝑖th component,  and 
𝐴𝑝𝐸𝑆𝐷  represents the Engineer’s Assessed Proportion of 
Effect for ESD. The right-side product is divided by 17 
since each of the failure mechanisms’ EPCs was 
multiplied by a scaling factor of 17 in order to maintain 
consistency with the original HEART method. This 
scaling factor is not necessary for the RFV, since the 
resulting RFs will be between the range of 0 and 1. 
      
To account for “consequence”, an analysis such as a 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) can be 
used to determine the criticality of electrical 
components, that is, to differentiate between critical and 
non-critical items. NASA defines “critical” as a 
condition where failure can “potentially result in loss of 
life, serious personal injury, loss of mission, or loss of a 
significant mission resource”. (21)  This will effectively 
correlate with consequence.  Thus, a separate RFV can 
be populated for critical and non –critical components. 
Figure 8 shows an example of an unpopulated RFV. 
The RF for each part relative to each failure mechanism 
is plotted along the horizontal axis.  
 
 
Fig 8 – Risk Factor Vector.  
 
Several studies have been conducted that identified 
flaws in the use of risk matrices. (22-23) Most of the 
flaws stem from the fact that the matrix population 
requires quantitative determination of magnitude 
along two dimensions, in terms of consequence and 
probability. This process is usually accomplished by 
experts. The use of the RFV eliminates these flaws 
since (1) the source of plotted quantitative information 
is empirical failure data and (2) only a probability 
factor is plotted since the consequence is determined 
using an FMEA or similar tool.  
 
4.3  Example Scenario 
 
To illustrate the proposed method, an example will be 
used depicting a parts list for space flight electrical 
hardware. The generic part types and sensitivity 
factors are given in Appendix A. 
 
The ESD, MOS and TOS ratings are shown for the 
parts in individual charts. The EPC magnitudes are 
obtained using the mapping of Table III for ESD, or 
from a simulated analysis of the mechanical and 
thermal stresses that the individual parts will see 
during assembly onto printed circuit boards and 
throughout system integration and testing. The Risk 
Factor Vector for the individual parts, with respect to 
failure mechanisms is shown in Figure 12. For clarity, 
only parts with a RF greater than or equal to 0.1 are 
shown.  Additionally, if parts had the same RF value, 
the symbols were stacked vertically to remain legible.  
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The figure shows that the most risk lies in parts W (for 
MOS) and T, L, and J (for ESD).    The original data for 












Based on the Risk Factor Vector shown in Figure 5-2, 
Parts J, L & T show the highest risk of become 
defective due to human error due to ESD, and part W 
has the greatest risk of defect caused by MOS. The 
most effective course of action to reduce the 
probability of a part failure would be to verify the 
condition of all ESD handling equipment and review 
prevention procedures. Additional actions would be to 
review lead bend-and-trim operations, and a 
recommendation to practice on spare components. 
Additionally, if the Risk Assessment is made early 
enough in the design phase, a part with a high 
sensitivity to a failure mechanism may be substituted 
for one with lower sensitivity. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper proposes a methodology for incorporating 
electrical component failure data into program’s Risk 
Assessment to more accurately assess and graphically 
communicate the risk of system failure due to human 
induced defects into electrical parts. This risk exists 
not only during the assembly, integration and testing 
phases of system development, but more importantly, 
during mission life. A parts list is used to demonstrate 
the method. The resulting Risk Factor Vector ranks the 
parts with the associated failure mechanisms in a 
color-coded format for easy communication. If the 
components used in the equipment were less sensitive, 
encountered less stress during the assembly process, or 
if their failures occurred less frequently in the past, 
then the expected Risk Factor would approach 0.    
 
A significant benefit of this method is to quickly 
communicate the biggest risk of potential electrical 
part failure due to human-induced defects in terms of 
part type and failure mechanism. This allows specific 
mitigating actions to be taken to reduce the largest 
risks. If the Risk Assessment is conducted early in the 
design stage of system development, high risk parts 
can possibly be substituted for ones that have a lower 
probability of becoming defective due to user error. 
Similarly, processes can be altered making these user 
errors less frequent. The process becomes a “living” 
risk assessment, which is updated with respect to 
changes made to parts on the parts list and observing 
the effect that process changes have on the frequency 
of part failures. 
 
As previously discussed, these failure mechanisms can 
cause defects in electrical components that will not 
result in immediate failures and therefore their 
condition may not be detected during testing. The 
environment in which electrical equipment will 
operate, such as outer space, adds significant, but 
predictable stresses, such as vibration during liftoff or 
thermal cycling during transit. It is possible that 
electrical components, damaged during the assembly, 
integration and testing process, will fail when 
encountering these typical mission stresses, long 
before their predicted failure due to wear-out. The goal 
of this proposed method is to highlight this risk of 
user-induced defects to sensitive components during 
system development and providing specific areas to 
apply risk mitigation actions. 
 
Instead of using a risk matrix, the method utilizes a 
unidimensional risk factor vector to plot the risk of 
failure for each of the electrical parts relative to the 
failure mechanism for which it is most sensitive. The 
“consequence” component of a typical risk matrix is 
accounted for by dividing the components into critical 
and non-critical categories using an FMEA. Thus, a 
separate RFV can be populated for critical and non-












Part Name ESD Rating EPCESD EPCESD EPC/17 RF = (EPC*Ap)/17 RF > 0.1
A .22UF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
B .68UF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
C 100nF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
D 100nF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
E 100pF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
F 200pF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
G 22nF Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
H Solid Tantalum Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
I Solid Tantalum Capacitor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
J 1A Switching Diode 1A 13 13 0.764705882 0.275294118 0.28
K 1/8A Solid Body Fuse 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
L P-Channel Mosfet 1A 13 13 0.764705882 0.275294118 0.28
M 5.11k Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
N 15.0k Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
O 5.62k Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
P 47 Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
Q 100k Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
R 10.0M Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
S 402k Resistor 3B 3 3 0.176470588 0.063529412
T MICROCIRCUIT, HYBRID, LINEAR, SINGLE DC DC Conv 1A 13 13 0.764705882 0.275294118 0.28
U Precision Rail-to-Rail I/O Op Amp 3A 5 5 0.294117647 0.105882353 0.11
V Precision Micropower Shunt Voltage Reference 2.00 7 7 0.411764706 0.148235294 0.14
W 12-Bit A/D Converter 3A 5 5 0.294117647 0.105882353 0.11
X Crystal Oscillator Clock 2.00 7 7 0.411764706 0.148235294 0.15
Y adjustable 3-terminal positive voltage regulators 2.00 7 7 0.411764706 0.148235294 0.15
Part Name
MOS Factor
EPCMOS =           
MOS Factor x 17 EPCMOS EPC/17 RF = (EPC*Ap)/17 RF > 0.1
A .22UF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
B .68UF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
C 100nF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
D 100nF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
E 100pF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
F 200pF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
G 22nF Capacitor 0.15 2.55 2.55 0.15 0.051
H Solid Tantalum Capacitor 0.20 3.4 3.4 0.2 0.068
I Solid Tantalum Capacitor 0.20 3.4 3.4 0.2 0.068
J 1A Switching Diode 0.30 5.1 5.1 0.3 0.102
K 1/8A Solid Body Fuse 0.20 3.4 3.4 0.2 0.068
L P-Channel Mosfet 0.35 5.95 5.95 0.35 0.119 0.12
M 5.11k Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
N 15.0k Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
O 5.62k Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
P 47 Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
Q 100k Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
R 10.0M Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
S 402k Resistor 0.25 4.25 4.25 0.25 0.085
T MICROCIRCUIT, HYBRID, LINEAR, SINGLE DC DC Conv 0.60 10.2 10.2 0.6 0.204 0.2
U Precision Rail-to-Rail I/O Op Amp 0.70 11.9 11.9 0.7 0.238 0.24
V Precision Micropower Shunt Voltage Reference 0.60 10.2 10.2 0.6 0.204 0.2
W 12-Bit A/D Converter 0.85 14.45 14.45 0.85 0.289 0.3
X Crystal Oscillator Clock 0.40 6.8 6.8 0.4 0.136 0.14
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